Abstract: This paper specifies and estimates an econometric model of the soybean market (grain, oil and meal) to assess the effects of U.S. domestic support to soybeans on world soybean prices, production and exports. The model divides the world into five regions (modules): Argentina, Brazil, the European Union, the United States (US) and the Rest of the
. Introduction
The Farm Bill of 996, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (Fair) Act, introduced significant changes in U.S. agricultural policy. This partial reform of agricultural policy was an attempt to reduce budget expenditures and to meet agreements signed in the Uruguay Round. Traditional types of assistance, mostly based on current production and market conditions, were discontinued in favor of decoupled payments (called production flexibility contracts, PFC) not associated with current production or area. All acreage restrictions were eliminated.
With the fall in prices after 997, U.S. government expenditures with Amber Box support (not excluding de minimis exemptions) went from US$ 7 billions in 997, to US$ 4 billion in 998, to US$ 23 billion in 999 and fell slightly to US$ 2 billion in 2000 (Hart and Babcock, Table 2, p. 0) . Support for soybeans under this category increased from almost zero in 997 to US$ .3 billion in 998, to US$ 2.8 billion in 999 and 2000.
Payments based on historical programs (the same as the PFCs), which have replaced the old Loan Deficiency Payments, have been another major component of U.S. support to agriculture. Expenditures under this heading went from US$ 5.2 billion in 996, to US$ 6.3 billion in 997, to US$ 8.4 billion in 998, to US$ 0.9 billion in 999 and have fallen slightly to US$ 0.5 billion in 2000 (OECD).
Soybeans have benefited from the U.S. commodity loan programs since 94, but were not subjected to the acreage restrictions imposed on feed grains, rice, wheat and upland cotton (Westcott and Price, p.5) . In most of the period after 970 market prices have been above the loan rate and the main benefit of the program was to provide liquidity to farmers until production was sold. This was not the case before 970 and in the middle of the decade of the 980s (see Westcott and Price pp. 6 and 7).
The marketing loan program in the U.S. started in 986 for rice and upland crop and was extended to soybeans and other oilseeds in 99 (Westcott and Price, p.3) and to wheat and feed grains in 993. The Fair Act continued the market loan program for these crops.
The PFC payments, introduced by the Fair Act, were an attempt to move towards income support rather than price support. Producers of commodities previously eligible for deficiency payments were entitled to payments based the area planted with such crops during the 5-year period previous to 996. Soybeans were not eligible for PFC payments.
The PFC payments have been considered by U.S. policy makers and by the WTO official decoupled with no or small effect on current production and on trade. However, time has shown that what seemed true in principle was not so in practice. With the elimination of acreage controls the PFC payments provided extra operating capital that allowed farmers to expand area. This took place for products that had higher returns per hectare. The increase in the loan rate for soybeans US$ 5.26 per bushel in the 997/98 marketing year triggered a substantial expansion of soybean acreage at the expenses of other crops, mainly wheat. But the production and trade distortions became even more evident with the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002 that allowed changes in base acreage and yield and, as such, introduced an expectation element in the farmer's decision process. In other words, farmers that grow soybeans (and other products included in the policy) now will be eligible to receive the subsidies of the 2008 Farm Bill. That is, tomorrow's subsidies induce more production, more exports and lower world prices today. This is clearly a non-decoupled form of domestic support.
After 999 the U.S. government introduced direct payments to soybean producers (the Oilseed Program). These payments were introduced after marketing loss assistance was granted to other crops and they are based on past areas and yields. Nevertheless, these payments have effects that are similar to the PFCs and are likely to raise current production in the U.S., raise U.S. exports and further reduce world prices of soybeans.
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA) of 2002 did not change principles embedded in the earlier policy and introduced counter cyclical payments that provide a guarantee against low prices. Again these payments are based on past acreage and yield, but through expectations they will increase U.S. production and exports and will depress world prices in the present.
In this paper we assess the effects of the U.S. domestic support to soybeans and its consequences to world prices and to Brazilian production and exports. To achieve this we first built an econometric model of the world soybean market. The counter factual analysis consisted of the elimination of the U.S. domestic support to soybeans and to track the impacts on the variables of interest.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents stylized facts about the production of soybeans in the U.S. and Brazil; section 3 describes the U.S. Marketing Assistance Loan Program and other policies that have distorting effects on production, trade and world prices; section 4 lays down the principal characteristics of the econometric model used to estimate the impact of domestic support in the U.S. on world prices and Brazilian production and exports; section 5 contains the principal results and section 6 concludes the paper.
Stylized facts
U.S. acreage for products where area was tied to deficiency payments before the Fair Act decreased substantially after 996. Between 996 and 2000 area reductions were as follows: corn .9 million hectares; wheat 5.0 million hectares; sorghum .6 million hectares; and barley 506 thousand hectares. During the same period the increase in soybeans area was 4.2 million hectares 5 , which shows that the change in legislation had a major impact on the area planted with this crop.
Production of soybeans increased mostly because of area, since yields did not change during this period 6 . This is seen in Table that displays area, production and yield for the period 979/200. Production increased 7 percent between 996 and 200, area increased 9 percent and yield, declined percent over the same period 7 . Figure , which is based on indices of three-year averages, shows the same data.
The corresponding data for Brazil are shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, 5 Area increases were also observed in cotton (358 thousand hectares); sunflower (04 thousand hectares) and rice (98 thousand hectares). 6 Yield is a partial index of productivity. A more appropriate indicator is the total factor productivity index, whose calculation goes beyond the scope of this analysis. These are based on the three-year averages.
where it can be seen the strong expansion of both area and yield during the same period. But the key difference is that domestic support has not changed at all during this period in Brazil, while this was not the case in the U.S.. A significant policy change that took place recently in Brazil was the elimination of the value added tax (ICMS) on exports of agricultural and semi processed goods in 996. In other words, market forces have driven the strong performance displayed by the sector in Brazil. Figure 3 shows the volume of U.S. soybeans exports since 990. After the loan rate was raised to US$ 5.26 per bushel in the 997/998-crop year exports have jumped, increasing percent between 997 and 999 and 2 percent between 998 and 999. U.S. exports have been expanding since 990, as figure 3 shows; however, from 998 to 200 they have shown additional vigor. This is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that the U.S. dollar has become stronger over this period, that world prices have been declining and that yields have not increased (Figure 4 shows export volumes and yield indices).
These elements show clearly that marketing assistance loan program have played a major role to explain the evolution of production and exports. In other words, while in Brazil the market has been the driving force behind the expansion of the soybean sector, in the U.S. the recent expansion is induced by government expenditures to support the sector.
The U.S. Marketing Loan Assistance, Fixed Payments and Counter Cyclical Payments
The US Marketing Loan Assistance Program operates through two instruments:
• Loan Rates; and • Marketing Loans. Loan Rates. The Marketing Loans for soybeans started in 99. Before their introduction only Loan Rates were available. These allow soybean farmers to borrow from the government with production pledged as loan collateral. The loan value is determined by a crop specific loan rate per unit of production. Farmers can borrow anytime after harvest through May 3. Most of the operations occur shortly after harvest when prices are seasonally low.
Loan repayment can be made in either of the forms below:
• payment of the principal plus interest; or • forfeiting ownership of the loan collateral and keeping the proceeds of the loan.
Marketing Loans. Marketing loans changed significantly the operation of the program. Farmers are allowed to repay the loans at prices below the original loan rate plus interest. This is likely to occur when market prices are below the loan rates.
With marketing loans the government accumulation of stocks is reduced, since farmers retain ownership of production and sell directly on the market. In consequence the policy has removed the price support mechanism embedded in the Loan Program before.
The benefits of the program to farmers are granted through two different channels:
• Loan Program. In this case production is pledged as collateral for the loan in the same form described before. But farmers can repay the loan, at anytime during the loan period, at market prices. For soybeans the repayment prices are posted county prices that are calculated daily. The difference between the Loan Rate and the county prices represents a benefit of the program for producers. Notice also that no interest accrues on the loan when the loan repayment rate is below the loan rate plus interest.
• Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP). In this case farmers do not take any loans and the benefit of the program is the difference between the loan rate and the county prices. If an LDP is paid on portion of a crop it is no longer eligible for a loan.
The benefits of the Marketing Loan feature of the program have been, on average, higher than described above. This is due to the fact that farmers retain ownership of production and to the fact that the Loan Rate no longer provides price support. Thus the decision to take the benefit of the Marketing Loan is independent of the decision to sell production.
Typically a farmer will take the benefit of the program at the time market prices are seasonally at the lowest point and sell the crop later when prices are high again. Westcott Thus, the marketing loan benefit amounts to 8.28 percent of the season average price and the revenue above the loan rate amounts to 5.6 percent. Westcott and Price (200) In the simulation made by these author's, the impacts on prices from 998 to 2000 are minor; the highest is in 200 when the marketing assistance loan reduces prices by 49 cents per bushel, corresponding roughly to a reduction of 0 percent relative to the baseline with the marketing loan assistance 8 . Westcott and Price (200) analysis takes into account the following crops: wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, oats, soybean, rice and cotton. The effect of the marketing loan assistance on area planted is larger from 999 to 200 with acreage increases of 80 to .6 million hectares 9 relative to the no marketing loan assistance scenario. As inspection of figures 20 to 24 (p. 6) of the paper indicates that the effects on upland cotton and on soybeans are the largest relative to those on wheat, corn and rice. A similar conclusion regarding to exports is suggested by figures 25 to 30, with the difference that impacts on rice exports are large too. And for prices, other than soybean, the conclusion of the authors is that: OECD (2000, p. 59) has performed a similar exercise. They have assumed that:
• there were no loan program payments for other crops and that other countries' policies remain unchanged; and
The paper does not contain tables. The percentage mentioned in the text is based on inspection of Figure 34 , page 20. This is equivalent to 2 to 4 million acres.
• the marketing loans to be US Based on these assumptions, they have concluded that:
"The withdrawal of such payments leads to lower soyabeans output (initially -5 percent) and increase the output of maize (initially +2 percent) and wheat (initially + percent). These production changes have temporary impacts on export levels and world prices. Initially world prices of soyabeans are 6 to 7 percent higher while world maize price are 3 percent lower. However, these effects are eroded by 2004 as markets adjust." (OECD 2000, p. 59) These studies indicate clearly that the Marketing Assistance Loan Program does have effects on world soybean prices and trade. However the impacts on Brazil's production and exports are not mentioned in the papers and cannot be inferred from their results. A dedicated model, where Brazil in explicitly included, is needed to make this assessment.
Direct payments for oilseeds were introduced in the crop year 999/2000 based on past acreage and yields. They not only have been maintained by the FSRIA but were raised from about US$ 0,5 per bushel to US$ 0,44 per bushel. These payments are now specific to soybeans and are based on the acreage and yields of the period 998/200. As before they are likely to be treated as decoupled by the WTO 
Target price -(higher of farm price or loan rate) -direct payment
Counter cyclical payments are based on area and yield of soybeans during past periods, and are likely to be treated as decoupled by the WTO 2 .
10 The actual value of the marketing loan assistance in 2000 was US$ 3/ton (calculations based on Hart and Babcock, 2001 , Table 2 and the U.S. production of 5,055 million tons). 11 Please see the introduction where we have argued that these payments are trade distorting. 12 Please see the introduction where we have argued that these payments are trade distorting.
For the sake of completeness, we indicate below the methodology established by the FSRIA to determine acreage and yields for both direct and counter cyclical payments. 
For direct payments

For counter cyclical payments
The area is determined exactly as in the case of the direct payments. As seen in the two boxes above the FSRIA raises total return by 4.75%. If the WTO accepts the view that direct and counter cyclical payments are decoupled, the part of the support that is considered non-trade distorting has actually decreased from US$ .08/bushel to US$ 0.82/bushel. This is a critical issue for the next round of trade negotiations and for the soybean panel against the U.S. in the WTO.
. Model structure and experiments
This section lays down the main aspects of the world soybean model, describes the steps to simulate the policy change and the counter factual analysis.
The world is divided into five regions (modules): Argentina, Brazil, the European Union, the United States (US) and the Rest of the World (ROW). The diagrams in Annex III show the model structure for each module.
For each module, area and yield equations determine the supply of soybeans. The domestic demand for soybeans by the crushing industry and the domestic demand for "Other Uses" of soybeans are estimated 3 . After determining the demand for crushing, "Other Uses" and soybeans supply, net exports are obtained from the identity: net exports = production -crushing demand -other uses Productions of oil and meal are fixed proportions of the volume of soybeans crushed. These are, in turn, divided in two parts: net exports and "Other Uses". We estimate equations for net exports of soybean meal and for "Other Uses" of soybean oil.
Net imports of soybeans, soybean oil and soybean meal of the rest of the world are exogenous, which means that they are not affected by the elimination of the U.S. Marketing Assistance Loan and other policies.
Equating net exports of the first four modules (Argentina, Brazil, European Union and the U.S.) to net imports of the ROW determines the international price of grain, oil and meal. These prices are expressed in domestic currency units, in real terms, by multiplying the dollar values by the region real exchange rate.
Equations linking the international price in domestic currency, to the domestic prices in domestic currency -price transmission equations -for the three products are also estimated. This is done with due consideration of domestic policies that may have affected this relation, such as the elimination of the export tax on soybeans in Brazil in 996.
The equations of the model, with the respective coefficients and statistics, are presented in Annex I. All variables have the correct signs and are significant. There is no evidence of autocorrelation of the residuals and the fit of model within the sample is good.
Comparing the baseline scenario with one where no subsidy exists allows for the estimation of the effects of the changes in policies. The baseline consists of the model forecasts for the period where data is available and of the projections, based on the relevant parameters of the FSRIA.
The two scenarios considered in the counter factual analyses are described below:
• Scenario . WTO rules are not changed and the Marketing Loan Assistance is the only policy that influences U.S. exports and world prices. This scenario is consistent with the lower impact on world prices and on world trade.
• Scenario 2. In addition to Marketing Loan Assistance, direct payments and counter cyclical payments are removed. This gives an upper bound for the impacts on world prices and world trade.
It is clear that neither the direct payments nor the counter cyclical payments are entirely decoupled, as assumed in Scenario 2. The impact of these two subsidies on production and exports depend on expectations regarding the next farm bill in 2007 and, as such, their effects may be smaller than those indicated in the simulations below. Nevertheless, the two scenarios give a reasonable range of variation for the variables relevant for this analysis. In Scenario 1 the values of the marketing loan payments are reduced to zero. In the Scenario 2 the producer return is the same as producer price, that is, the marketing loan payments, the direct payments and the counter cyclical payments are all reduced to zero. Scenario 1. Tables 4 to 3 contain results of simulations. Table 4 contains estimated price changes due to the removal of the marketing loan assistance. The average increase in world prices increase over the period 998/2004 in 3.95 percent, with highest values, of the order of 7 percent, in 2000 and in 200 when the marketing loan payments were at their peak. It is seen that producer prices in the U.S. are reduced on average .48 percent and Brazilian prices increase by about 3.8 percent, in line with the change in world prices.
Results
It must be noted that the world price changes estimated by the model are in line with those obtained in other studies, such as those of Westcott and Price (999, 200) and the OECD Agricultural Outlook (2000). The fact that removing large subsidies to commodities does not cause large impacts on market prices is well known and documented in the literature, as noted by Valdés and Foster (2002) .
The changes in world oil and meal prices are seen in Table 5 . The average impact on oil prices is quite surprising, since it is even higher than the impact on grain prices. This is caused by the large reduction on crushing in the U.S. and by the small effect on domestic consumption. Meal prices, on the other hand, increase less than soybean world prices. Table 6 shows the impacts on soybeans production in Argentina, Brazil and the U.S.. There is a reduction of approximately 30 million tons during the period 998/2004 in the U.S. production of soybeans, which correspond to approximately 5.3 percent of the production estimated in the baseline. This is, in part, compensated by increases in Argentina and Brazil of the order of 4 percent in each country. The largest impacts on Brazil take place during the period 200 and 2003, where production losses between 2 and 2.5 million tons per year. Tables 7, 8 and 9 show the corresponding impacts on soybean oil production, soybean meal production and in soybean crushing. These impacts are in line with the changes observed in world prices and in soybeans production. Notice that the impact on Brazil is quite significant compared with that of Argentina and of the European Union.
In summary, the analysis of these tables indicate that the removal of the marketing loan assistance in the U.S. will have favorable impacts on soybean production as well as on the domestic crushing industry. Tables 0 to 3 show net exports. The results indicate again that the impact of the removal of this subsidy on the world market is significant. Exports from the U.S. would be smaller (about 3 million tons in 2002) and those of Brazil and Argentina increased. In Brazil the highest impact is in 200, about 2 million tons, and the impact, during the period 998/2004, is of the order of 7 million tons. The impact on the value of exports, as seen in Table , is By the total value of net exports of the soybean complex are larger, since Brazilian exports of soybean oil and soybean meal will increase too. The total effect reaches the value of US$ 75 million in 200, dropping to US 699 millions in 2002. The total increment of exports of the soybean complex during the period is US$ 3 billion.
These results illustrate another perverse aspect of the current concepts used in the WTO regarding export subsidies. The marketing loan assistance is defined as domestic support (Amber Box). However, its impacts on U.S. exports are large relative to the change in production, as the following analysis shows. Total reduction in production in the U.S. over the period 998/2004 is of the order of 30 million tons. This is turn lead to a reduction of about 4 million tons in crushing and 4 million tons in exports of soybeans. That is, 50 percent of the effect on production influences directly exports. The 50 percent directed to additional crushing also finds its way to the world markets through more exports of soybean oil and soybean meal. Thus, this program contains an important element of export subsidy that is ignored by the current definitions adopted in the WTO.
Scenario 2. Tables 4 to 23 contain results of simulations. The results encountered in this scenario do not differ qualitatively of those found in Scenario . The difference in the simulation between the two is that we have included fixed payments and counter cyclical payments as if they were not decoupled. As noted before, there is clearly an impact on production and trade induced by these policies that works through an expectation mechanism induced by the fact that the 2007 farm bill is likely to allow revisions of acreage and yield and only farmers who are now producing will be eligible for the revisions. To capture this mechanism in an econometric model is not easy and not feasible since the data is not yet available. In view of this difficulty, the authors agreed to simulate the effect of the removal of these policies as if they were not decoupled. This is likely to provide an upper bound for the actual impacts of the change in policy.
It is not necessary to analyze Tables 4 to 23 in detail since the nature of the results is similar. Nevertheless, we emphasize the points below.
• World price of soybeans increase by a maximum of 9 percent in 2000 and the increase remains above 7 percent in 200 and 2002.
• Producer prices in the U.S. are reduced 6 percent on average, with values as high as 20 percent towards the end of the period.
• Brazilian losses due to the policy can be summarized as follows: production of soybeans is reduced by almost 3 million tons during the period 998/2004; during the same period net exports of soybeans are reduced by 9 million tons, equivalent to US$ 2.2 billion; and net exports of the soybean complex are reduced by US$ 4 billions.
Summary
This paper has analyzed the impact of the current U.S. policy for soybeans on Brazilian production and trade of soybean and soybean products. The main findings of the study were:
• The elimination of the domestic support to soybeans will increase world prices of soybeans and of soybean products. The average increase in soybean prices during the period 998/2004 varies between 4 and 5 percent according to the liberalization scenario considered. The maximum increase in prices occurs in 2000 and 200, when the marketing loan program provided the highest levels of support.
• Brazilian production over the entire period is reduced between 0 and 3 million tons.
• Exports of soybeans are reduced between 7 and 9 million tons, equivalent to US$ .6 to US$ 2.2 billion.
• Exports of the soybean complex are reduced between US$ 3 and US$ 4 billion dollars.
• This domestic support provided by U.S. policy has a significant impact on trade, since about 50 percent of the increase in soybean production will be exported directly. But the total impact is even greater since exports of soybean meal and soybean oil will take place too.
In conclusion this subsidy is causing damage to Brazilian producers and exporters. Governmental initiatives leading to the elimination of this type of support are important not only because of the estimated impacts but because these policies are likely to continue and cumulative effects can cause distress in the sector, with reductions in income and employment. The equations for area and yield for the U.S. were reestimated for Scenario 2. The new equations are shown in Table 32 below. 
Tables
Annex I -Equations
Argentina Module
argfapid - - - - 0.9863 - (0.003) argolpid - - - - - 0.996 (0.003) argsjpid - - - 0.5844 - - (0.02) argfaoc(-1) - -0.594 - - - - (0.2283) argoloc(-1) - - -0.4500 - - - (0.20) argsjoc(-1) -0.076 - - - - - (0.0956) argsjoc(-2) -0.739 - - - - - (0.099) argfaqp-argfaqp(-1) - 0.38 - - - - (0.0585) argsjqp-argsjqp(-1) 0.5355 - - - - - (0.0499) argpib - - .2975 - - - (0.223) argostax 1 - - - 6.0704 - - (2.282) 1 Not logarithm- -4.606 - - - - (2.230) brsjpid - - - 0.960 - - (0.002) brfaqp .24 - - - - - (0.0909) brsuqp -0.744 - - - - - (0.0886) brfaexl(-1) 0.00 - - - - - (0.0637) broloc(-1) - - -0.9777 - - - (0.3400) broloc(-2) - - -0.69 - - - (0.3405) broloc(-3) - - -0.3934 - - - (0.2763) brfrango -0.766 - - - - - (0.0649) brpop - - .2673 - - - (0.3475) brtjur 1 - -65.933 - - - - (37.5900) brsjoc(-2) 1 - -0.7322 - - - - (0
European Union Module
cefapid(-1) - - - - -0.227 - (0.37) ceolpid - - 0.200 - - (0.0536) ceolpid 1 - - - - .2888 (0.027) ceolpid(-1) 1 - - - - - -0.7004 (0.678) cesjpid 1 - - - 0.4707 - - (0.076) ceolpdd(-1) 1 - - - - - 0.4377 (0.747) ceolqp 1 - - 0.000 - - - (0.000) ceruqp - 0.4672 - - - - (0.506) cefaiml(-1) - 0.5666 - - - - (0.489) cesjiml(-1) -0.220 - - - - - (0.2864) cesjiml(-2) 0.2527 - - - - - (0.2687) ceolexl(-2) - - 0.4060 - - - (0.0748) cesjtcr*misjpid -0.3084 - - - - - (0.54) dummy - - - -
U.S. Module
- -54.9704 - - - - (2.9759) euasjpid - - - .0073 - - (0.0346) euafapdd(-1) 1 - - - - -0.0485 - (0.0396) euafaqp 2.9342 - - - - - (0.3850) euafaexl(-2) -0.39 - - - - - (0.069) euaoloc(-2) - - -0.2946 - - - (0.683) euasjoc(-2) 1 - -0.3379 - - - - (0.692) dummy - - - - -.
